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Abstract Much has been written about the ethics of sex selection. This article thoroughly explores the ethical arguments put forth
in the literature both for and against non-medical sex selection using sperm sorting. While most of these arguments come from phi-
losophers, feminist scholars, social scientists and members of the healthcare community, they are often echoed in empirical studies
that have explored community values. This review is timely because the first efficacious method for sex selection via sperm sorting,
MicroSort, is currently in clinical trials and moving closer to FDA approval for marketing in the USA. While the clinical trials are cur-
rently focused on the use of MicroSort to avoid X-linked genetic diseases, MicroSort can also be used to satisfy parental preferences.
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Introduction
Technologies including ultrasound or prenatal testing fol-
lowed by selective abortion, preimplantation genetic selec-
tion (PGS) for sex, as well as numerous sperm-sorting
techniques, are now available to families desiring a child
of a specific sex. Selective abortion is an effective means
of selecting for sex, but it requires the termination of a
pregnancy. PGS is also highly effective, but is invasive and
expensive and usually results in discarding healthy embryos.
Sperm-sorting technologies avoid both ethical concerns
about loss of fetal or embryonic life and invasive proce-
dures, but most methods do not work reliably (Flaherty
and Matthews, 1996).
MicroSort is distinctive because it has proven efficacious
particularly when selecting for a girl (Fugger et al., 1998). It
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works by exposing spermatozoa to a fluorescent dye. The
spermatozoa are passed through a flow cytometer, which
is able to sort the spermatozoa on the basis of cell fluores-
cence. Spermatozoa with an X chromosome (indicating a
girl) glow more brightly. This technology has proven to be
93% effective for selecting girls and 82% effective for select-
ing boys. (www.microsort.com/?page_id=453) Genetics and
IVF, the company licensed to develop MicroSort for human
use, currently has FDA approval to conduct clinical trials
among couples who are at risk of having a child with an
X-linked disease such as Duchene muscular dystrophy or
haemophilia. Previously, Genetics and IVF had FDA approval
to conduct clinical trials for ‘family balancing’. In other
words, couples that already had a child of one sex could
use MicroSort to attempt to create a child of the sex they
did not already have.
Because preconception sex selection to avoid X-linked
genetic diseases is widely accepted as ethical, the pur-
pose of this review is to explore the ethical arguments
in favour of and against the use of preconception sex
selection for non-medical purposes, especially parental
preference. Arguments unique to abortion and PGS are
not considered. While arguments are usually promoted
by bioethics, feminist, social science and healthcare
scholars, research has also been conducted to explore
lay/community values. When appropriate, these data are
also discussed.
Arguments in favour of sex selection for
parental preference
Freedom of choice
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argued that the only purpose
for which someone’s freedom can be constrained is to pro-
tect other individuals (Mill, 1859). This is by far the stron-
gest and most common argument in favour of sex
selection for parental preference (Dahl, 2003; Dickens,
2002; Dickens et al., 2005; Farrell, 2002; Macklin, 2010;
Purdy, 2007; Rhodes, 2001; Robertson, 2001, 2002, 2004;
Savulescu and Dahl, 2000; Savulescu, 2001; Steinbock, 2002;
Stock, 2001; Tizzard, 2004). It is also the ethical basis by
which many sex-selection providers justify making this tech-
nology available (Puri and Nachtigall, 2010). The idea is that
people should be able to decide for themselves what kind of
life they want to live, including the ‘right’ to make decisions
about choices as personal as when, with whom and how to
have children. Additionally, even if some might find this
choice morally repugnant, the government has no right to
interfere unless there is evidence of harm to the person
using the technology, the resulting child or the society. Thus
far, there is no empirical evidence that sex-selection tech-
nologies for parental preference result in harm to users or
off-spring. However, sex-ratio imbalances, because of the
use of selective abortion, exist in Asian countries and may
be a compelling reason for those countries to limit access
to sex-selective technologies.
Some advocates of ‘a presumption in favour of liberty’
would consider allowing restrictions on using sex-selective
technologies designed to limit distortions in the general
sex ratio (Dickens, 2002). Reproduction by its very nature
affects others; therefore, reproductive freedom might be
limited when having a negative effect on others (O’Neill,
2006). Restrictions might include limiting access to these
technologies only to families who want to have children of
each sex; imposing taxes on those who use it for the more
requested sex; developing clinic waiting lists for those
who want the sex that is more often requested (Heng,
2006); and preventing people from outside the USA (or other
countries where the technology is illegal) from engaging in
reproductive tourism.
Others, like Dawson and Trounson (1996), argue that
restrictions of any kind violate the right ‘to freely form fam-
ilies given in the Declaration of Human Rights’. Dawson pos-
its that restricting access to ‘family balancing’ is unfair to
families that live in one-child-only nations and that any
restrictions on sex selection will lead to sex-selective abor-
tions. Dickens (2002) also finds that prohibitions on sex
selection are unnecessarily oppressive in countries where
no sex bias exists. Savulescu (2001) takes an even stronger
stand in arguing that any imposition by government on
reproductive freedom with the goal of some kind of societal
good (such as equality) is similar to the eugenic efforts
made by the Nazis.
Avoids erosion of reproductive rights
Scholars are concerned about restrictions on reproductive
rights, including the use of sex-selection technologies,
because it could lead to an erosion of the right to terminate
a pregnancy or to make other reproductive choices
(Fletcher, 1980). A number of US state legislatures have
attempted to or have passed laws that make it illegal for
a woman to have an abortion because of the sex of the fetus
(Generations Ahead, 2010). If sex selection through sperm
sorting or PGS were regulated at the state or federal level,
many fear this would provide additional justification to
allow the government to restrict access to abortion ser-
vices. Nonetheless, those who argue against any govern-
mental intrusion in reproductive decisions may still
support those who voluntarily limit the types of services
they are willing to provide, such as refusing to provide sex
selection for parental preference for a first child. They
argue that the technology is only a symptom of the perva-
sive underlying problem of sexism and that these social
and cultural issues must be addressed directly (Dickens
et al., 2005; Macklin, 2010).
Avoids abortion of fetuses and destruction of
embryos
Preconception sperm sorting is currently the only sex-
selection technology that avoids the destruction of embryos
or fetuses because it selects spermatozoa prior to the crea-
tion of embryos. As a result, sperm sorting avoids many of
the ethical concerns associated with using PGS or prenatal
testing followed by abortion for the purpose of sex selection
(Hall et al., 2006; van Balen, 2006). Dickens (2002), Dawson
and Trounson (1996) and Puri and Nachtigall (2010) take the
argument a step further by concluding that any restrictions
on sperm sorting in areas where there are strong cultural
preferences for boys will, in fact, lead to abortions, risks
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to the physical and mental health of women and risks to the
health and wellbeing of girls who are not wanted.
Best interest of the child
Doyal and McLean (2005) argue that using sex selection to
ensure a good future for one’s offspring is not sexist. Rather,
children born to parents who desire a child of one sex are
more likely to have a positive future, particularly in cultures
that have a strong sex preference. If a girl born into a patriar-
chal society is more likely to be neglected or abused, for
example, it might be ethically better to allow the parents
to choose the sex of their child before it is even conceived
(Dickens, 2002; Dickens et al., 2005; Savulescu, 2001;
Steinbock, 2002). Dai (2001) echoes this advantage of sex
selection. She argues that ‘it may forestall potential psycho-
logical suffering of unwanted children’. Dai grew up with low
self-confidence because she knew her parents wished that
she had been a boy. Rhodes (2001) argues that sex selection
may be in the best interest of the child regardless of whether
the society has a strongmale preference. Allowing families to
select for a desired sex avoids the birth of multiple children
when families are trying to have a girl/boy naturally. A child
that is the desired sex is more likely to receive nurturing.
Fewer children in a family means that the family’s economic
and human resources are not stretched as thin (Kilani and Haj
Hassan, 2002; Rhodes, 2001).
Along a different but related line of reasoning, Robertson
(2001) and Savulescu (2001) make use of Parfit’s (1984)
argument that it is impossible to say that a child has been
harmed by any choices that parents make if, without those
choices, the child would not exist. They use it to argue that
if a couple would choose not to reproduce unless they can
be guaranteed a girl, the child, once born, cannot claim
to have been harmed. Without this choice, her parents
would not have had her. They are not arguing that the
not-yet-conceived child is somehow harmed, only that a
child born based on parental decisions cannot claim that
she was somehow harmed by that decision when that deci-
sion is what ultimately caused her to exist.
Advantages for women living in oppressive societies
Sex selection may have advantages for women living in
oppressive societies. In some Asian cultures, women are
blamed for not producing male children. Dai (2001) argues
that such women might consider themselves lucky if hus-
bands only take a mistress in order to produce a male child
rather than divorcing. Asian families may ostracize a woman
who does not produce a male child. Additionally, many
Indian and other Asian women will undergo prenatal testing
and selective abortion of female fetuses or agree to or be
coerced into female infanticide to avoid the stigma of a
daughter. As a result, sperm sorting might be less physically
and emotionally harmful to women who live in such oppres-
sive societies (Dai, 2001; Steinbock, 2002). Again, Rhodes
(2001) steps outside the patriarchal society but still argues
that it may be advantageous for both women and men to
attain their goal of a gender-balanced family with as few
children as possible since additional children increase the
economic and human burdens of caring for a family.
Arguments against sex selection
Sex-ratio imbalance
Some commentators have argued against allowing the use of
sex-selection technologies because they might lead to sig-
nificant imbalances in the normal sex ratio. These sex-ratio
imbalances may result in social upheaval (Hvistendahl,
2011). Hudson and Boer (2004) have described ‘broken
branches’ – men who do not have wives and lose the oppor-
tunity to have children because the abortion of female
fetuses in the previous decades has led to a sex-ratio imbal-
ance. Not only do these men not have the opportunity to
form families, but men with spouses tend to be healthier
and live longer lives. On this basis, Etzioni (1968) and Fukuy-
ama (2003) predict that a reduction in the female popula-
tion will result in less culture, less church attendance and
increased violence. Sociologically, the explanation for the
increase in violent crime seems straightforward:
... young adult men with no stake in society – of the low-
est socioeconomic classes and with little chance of form-
ing families of their own – are much more prone to
attempt to improve their situation through violent and
criminal behaviour in a strategy of coalitional aggression
with other bare branches (Hudson and Boer, 2004).
Similarly, although some commentators posit that the
status of women in society might increase if there were
fewer females, others worry that women in these societies
may increasingly be viewed solely for their sexual and repro-
ductive capacities (Baldwin, 2006; Hvistendahl, 2011).
Researchers who have studied societies with a preponder-
ance of men have found that such cultures generally empha-
size virginity and the sanctity of the family, and women are
often viewed as inferior to men in reasoned judgment,
scholarship and political affairs (Bumgarner, 2007; Gutten-
tag and Secord, 1983).
What is fairly clear is that banning access to new
sperm-sorting technologies will not reduce the sex-ratio
imbalances in these societies. The imbalances are based in
economic, religious and cultural factors that result in a
preference for boys. Since a cheaper and more effective
means of selecting for sex already exists (ultrasound and
abortion), banning a preconception method will not solve
the problem. Similarly, making it available in Western coun-
tries is unlikely to exacerbate the problem overseas (Bharg-
ava, 2005).
Empirical research conducted throughout the Western
world appears to indicate that it is unlikely that preconcep-
tion sex-selection technologies will alter sex ratios (Dahl,
2003, 2005; Dahl et al., 2003, 2006). In order for there to
be a sex-ratio imbalance, there must be both a strong sex
preference and an easy means to select for sex. There is
little evidence to suggest that there is a sex preference in
industrialized countries. Instead, families that have a pref-
erence want to have children of both sexes.
Concerns about creating sex-ratio imbalances in the West
can be addressed by limiting sex selection to ‘family balanc-
ing’ or equalling out the number of children born of each
sex. A secondary measure that falls short of complete pro-
hibition would be for the state to create incentives through
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taxes and distribution of social services for families to have
children of the sex that is less in demand (Heng, 2006).
Inherently sexist and violates human dignity
Many scholars have argued that sex selection is inherently
sexist because it involves making value judgments about a
person or potential person based solely on sex (Dai, 2001;
Levy, 2007; President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003; Strange
and Chadwick, 2009). For example, the feminist philosopher
Powledge (1981) argues that choosing the sexes of children is
one of the greatest displays of sexism. Sex selection, she
finds, is wrong because it bases the worth of a human being
on its sex. Concern that sex selection for parental preference
supports sexist practices was the American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists’ (2007) primary objection to the
use of sex-selection technologies for non-medical purposes.
Some commentators have argued that choosing the sex
of one’s children is a violation of human dignity because
children have the right to be loved, respected and valued
for their inherent worth (Blyth et al., 2008), not treated like
a commodity.
Other commentators have argued that the use of
sex-selection technology is not inherently sexist (Kluge,
2007; Mahowald, 2000; Robertson, 2001; Steinbock, 2002;
Wertz, 2001). While some parental motives may be sexist,
the vast majority of American couples who wish to use sex
selection want to do so for ‘family balancing’ purposes.
They are likely to already have two or three children of
one gender and wish for a child of the opposite sex (Dahl,
2007; Strong, 1997). This desire to experience parenting a
boy in addition to a girl, for example, is not necessarily sex-
ist (Steinbock, 2002). Others have argued that parents who
are focused on the best interest of their child in a sexist
society are motivated by concern for their child, and this
is not inherently sexist (Ten, 1998). Although concerns that
the use of sex-selection technology exacerbates sexist atti-
tudes, it does not follow that policies banning or limiting
access to the technology will reduce sexism in society.
Harmful to children
Sperm sorting with intrauterine insemination (IUI) is not
100% accurate. As a result, some opponents have expressed
concern that children who are conceived using it but are the
less desired sex will be aborted or brought into a family that
does not want them (Dai, 2001). The children of couples
using preconception sex selection after the birth of multiple
children of one sex also might come to believe that they are
not what their parents wanted. The use of sperm sorting by
parents for family balancing could also suggest to these chil-
dren that everything, including a baby, is a purchasable
commodity. Finally, Sills and Palermo (2002) are concerned
that there may be serious psychological issues for a child
conceived using sex selection in terms of their interpersonal
development, socialization and core identity. They caution
parents using sex selection to be prepared for the question:
‘Why did you make me this way?’
Although there is no empirical research to support these
concerns, families using sperm sorting with IUI can be coun-
selled about the reliability of the method. If they are not
willing to accept the risk that the fetus might not be the
desired sex, they can be counselled to consider combining
sperm sorting with PGS (Robertson, 2001). Additionally,
the fact that families sometimes have children who are
not the desired sex will not change with the introduction
of sperm-sorting technologies. The psychological harm that
might come to existing children who then know or believe
they are not the sex their parents wanted presupposes that:
(i) they do not already assume their parents desired a child
of the opposite sex; and (ii) that the parents have disclosed
their use of the technology to their children. As more chil-
dren are created through sex-selection technologies, psy-
chologists can study these families to empirically
determine whether these concerns are warranted.
Another related objection is that parents of a child born
following sex selectionmay expect the child to behave in cer-
tain gender-specific ways and the child may be resented if
they fail to do so (Bhatia, 2010; Generations Ahead, 2010;
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2004). Levy (2007) argues
that even if a girl is selected, the simple fact that certain
characteristics are attributed to girls puts unreasonable gen-
dered expectations on that child. The belief that there are
gender differences is a product of sexism. Levy argues
‘[c]atering to [individual] whims’ by providing sex selection
endorses sexist practices. There is currently no empirical evi-
dence the use of sex-selection technology increases the
existing preconceived ideas couples have about the gender
of a child. This concern might be addressed by requiring cli-
ents to undergo counselling about gender expectations prior
to using the technology as suggested by the Ethics Committee
of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (2004).
A number of commentators (Davis, 2001, 2010; Murray,
1996) have argued against sex selection on the basis that chil-
dren ought to have a ‘right to an open future’. What this
means is that children ought to be brought into theworldwith
as much freedom as possible to figure out for themselves who
they are or want to become. Davis writes: ‘to view a child pri-
marily through its gender narrows the child’s ability to choose
his or her own path through life’. When a child is selected
based on sex, the ‘full humanity of each girl and boy’ is not
celebrated (Davis, 2001). Similarly, Habermas (2003) is con-
cerned that children may ‘no longer regard themselves as
the sole authors of their own life history’. Baldwin (2006)
articulates this argument nicely. The problem is:
... the child’s own discovery of [the use of sex selection]
is held to induce a profound sense of alienation: when a
daughter discovers that her sex is not a chance result
which she can integrate as such into her own sense of
her identity, but is the product of her parents’ wish to
have a child of that sex, she relates to it primarily as
something that has been imposed upon her, so that her
sense of her own identity as a girl is of someone who
has been deliberately created by someone else to be of
that sex.
There are others who argue that gender stereotypes are
endemic already. Whether parents use technology to have a
boy or conceive one naturally, certain behaviours are attrib-
uted to boys. Eliminating the ability to choose the sex of a
child will not eliminate these stereotypes or pressures that
parents put on their children to meet certain expectations
of what it means to be male or female (Steinbock, 2002).
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There is a concern that if reproductive technologies pro-
gress to the point where parents can choose attributes of
their children, parents will begin to think of children as com-
modities (Strong, 2001). If money is invested to create a child
of a certain sex, something is expected for that investment. If
that investment does not turn out as expected (a child is not
born or is not the desired sex), parents may feel as though
they have been cheated. Leon Kass (2002), philosopher and
former Chair of the President’s Council on Bioethics, argues:
... the price to be paid for producing optimum or even
genetically sound babies will be the transfer of procre-
ation from the home to the laboratory. Increasing control
over the product can only be purchased by the increasing
depersonalization of the entire process and its coinci-
dent transformation into manufacture. Such an arrange-
ment will be profoundly dehumanizing.
Distortions in birth order
If enough parents utilize sex selection and choose to have a
male as their first child, there is the potential to cause
social inequality between the sexes. Some research has indi-
cated that the first-born child is more likely to be successful
in life (Andrews quoted in Belkin, 1999). For example, War-
ren (1992) has found that first-born children tend to be more
independent, active, dominant, intelligent, responsible and
conservative. First-born children also have an advantage in
that they have a monopoly on their parents’ time and atten-
tion early in life (Warren, 1992). Yet, Hvistendahl (2011)
found that in Indian and Asian cultures, families tend to
leave the sex of the first born up to nature, but will then
intervene to ensure that a second or third child is a boy if
the first was a girl. If this is true, concern about a genera-
tion of ‘little sisters’ is without empirical support.
Data from American reproductive centres suggest that
most couples who are willing to undergo preconception sex
selection already have two or three children of the same
sex and wish to have at least one child of the opposite sex.
A 1989 study analysed 2505 inquiry letters from couples and
found that only 1.4% were childless couples seeking to use
sex selection to have a boy (Chico, 1989). Even if preconcep-
tion sex selection becomes widely available and leads to a
statistically observable increase in the number of first-born
boys, it does not follow that this will create inequities in soci-
ety. After a thorough review of the literature on birth-order
differences, Salmon concludes that the empirical evidence
does not ‘provide any significant evidence to support a claim
that pre-conception sex selectionwill result in second-best or
poor-achieving girls: neither does it guarantee that such an
outcome might not occur’ (Salmon, 2007).
Unknown safety
Safety is a legitimate ethical concern with any new medical
technology. If there is strong reason to believe that a new
technology could have harmful effects on persons who use
it or persons who are the result of it, there may be a legit-
imate argument to regulate or ban it.
Unlike other innovative reproductive procedures, Micro-
Sort involves the use of a new medical device and thus
requires a more stringent review of safety and efficacy by
the FDA. Despite the fact that hundreds of apparently healthy
children have been born using this technology, it is still not
FDA approved for marketing. Additionally, because MicroSort
involves the direct manipulation of human gametes, its
long-term safety must also be studied. All new reproductive
technologies involve an unknown amount of long-term risk.
In fact, every drug or medical procedure involves some
amount of risk, but patients are permitted to use them so long
as the patient is fully informed about the potential risks and
voluntarily agrees to undergo the procedure or to take the
medication. Thus the way to address the hereto unknown
long-term risks associated with MicroSort is via full disclosure
to individuals who wish to use this technology and follow-up
research on children. Because there are potential long-term
implications for the child-to-be, parents will be accepting
this risk on behalf of their future child. But parents give con-
sent on behalf of their future children every time they use any
kind of assisted reproductive technology.
The loss of what it means to be a parent
Empirical studies with two groups of lay people in the USA and
Switzerland found that some participants thought that trying
to manipulate the design of one’s children requires a loss of
what it means to be a parent. Parental love, they argued,
ought to be unconditional (Kalfoglou et al., 2008; Scully
et al., 2006). Rothman (1986) wrote that sex selection denies
parents the lesson of having to make the best of the ‘wrong’
sex. Finally, commentators are concerned that sex selection
will change the meaning of parental love and acceptance
(Baldwin, 2006; Murray, 1996). Parents, Murray (1996)
argues, are choosing to have this child, not a child.
This may be a legitimate concern and it may provide a
justification for moral exhortation to avoid using the tech-
nology, but public policy should not be based on unproven
fears. Future follow-up research with families who have
use sex-selection technologies may help us understand
whether this harm really exists.
Slippery slope to increased acceptance of other
eugenic technologies
There is the widely popular objection that sex selection is
the first step down a road that will inevitably lead to the
creation of ‘designer babies’ (Macklin, 2010; President’s
Council on Bioethics, 2003; Sandel, 2007; Strong, 2001).
Once parents are permitted to choose the sex of their chil-
dren, it may be difficult to justify stopping at choosing other
characteristics such eye colour, height or intelligence, par-
ticularly if these selections are meant to give children an
advantage in society (Strong, 2001). Changes this drastic
in how decisions are made about who is allowed to be born
might also create a climate where parents are blamed when
their children are born with imperfections. Parents of a
handicapped child will become aware of this handicap pre-
natally and have to make an affirmative choice to continue
the pregnancy (Strong, 2001). This ‘choice’ could come with
social condemnation.
Allowing enhancements or the selection of desired traits
could erode our freedom from state-enforced genetic
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manipulation of the next generation (Strong, 2001; Wertz
and Fletcher, 1989). Sandel (2007) is concerned because
PGS, particularly as it enables the selection of traits, is
not limited to just the infertile or those with genetic disease
risks. The ability to select for traits becomes available to
the general public, and ‘selection is the first step to design’.
As Macklin (2010) points out, this slippery slope argument
is based on the belief that the slide is inevitable and that
where it leads is morally objectionable. There is no evi-
dence that a slide into acceptance of genetic enhancement
is inevitable. Permitting parents to choose the sex of their
children does not mean that society cannot place limits on
the availability of technologies that might lead to genetic
enhancements. Arguments about the ethics of genetic
enhancement are outside the scope of this discussion, but
there is no empirical evidence that use of these technolo-
gies would have profoundly negative effects on society
(Dahl, 2007).
Medical procedures should only be performed for
medical reasons
Yet another objection to sex selection is based on the claim
that medical procedures ought to be employed only for
medical purposes. Flow cytometric sperm separation, it is
argued, is a medical technology designed to enable couples
who are at risk of transmitting a severe X-linked genetic dis-
order to have a healthy child. In the absence of a known risk
to transmit a serious X-linked disease, there is simply no
valid justification for using flow cytometric sperm separa-
tion (Dresser, 2001; Sauer, 2001).
Others have pointed out that constitutional reproductive
rights are a right of non-interference, not a positive right
that requires physicians to assist with every reproductive
request. Strong (2001), for example, argues that physicians
have the freedom to refuse to perform non-medical sex
selection. In fact, physicians are justified in creating ethical
or practice guidelines against this use of technology on the
grounds that it is a step towards condoning genetic
enhancement and that it gives parents too much control
over the characteristics of their offspring.
On the other hand, medical technology is used all the
time to address non-medical concerns and desires. Contra-
ception is not a disease-preventing technology, but it is still
permitted, and insurance companies often cover it (Heyd,
2003). In order to justify the use of drugs, medical devices,
interventions and surgeries, our society has turned ageing,
physical attractiveness and even the ability to conceive
and bear children into ‘pathologies’. In many cases, these
‘pathologies’ are simply the result of genetic variation or
the ageing process. Regardless, we ‘treat’ baldness, wrin-
kles and erectile dysfunction with drugs and other ‘medical’
interventions, and infertility is now largely perceived to be
a disease rather than a social condition. Although the use of
professional guidelines or individual healthcare providers’
consciences to place limits on reproductive technology is
a step back from government-based laws regulating repro-
ductive decisions, this produces its own set of concerns. If
physicians are the gatekeepers deciding who gets access
to what technology, they become agents of society in imple-
menting social or religious values (Heyd, 2003).
Inappropriate use of limited medical resources
Medical care is a limited resource. Some authors have noted
that physicians who are providing non-medical sex selection
could be using their time and talent to provide care that
prevents or treats disease and injury. Perhaps the use of a
physician’s time, talents and other medical resources could
be better allocated (American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, 1999). Dahl (2007) argues that this criticism is
flawed because it implies that every time a person gets cos-
metic surgery, another person is denied necessary medical
care. This objection betrays a severely distorted conception
of economics and simply does not work in a predominantly
private-run capitalist economy based on a free market.
Physicians’ medical training is sometimes subsidized by
tax dollars, so this creates an obligation to use medical
training in the best interest of society (Pennings, 2002). Fur-
ther, funds invested in developing the technology and buy-
ing access to it might be better spent. Pennings (2002)
suggests that in countries where physicians’ training is sub-
sidized by public taxes, there ought to be a tax on non-med-
ical sex selection to offset this social investment.
Social injustice
If being a certain sex carries with it certain advantages, such
as the potential to earn more if you are male because of gen-
der bias, access to sex-selection technologies could perpetu-
ate advantages for those who can afford them (Strong, 2001).
Bhatia points out that in Western culture, the affluent will
have access to the socially approved sex-selection technolo-
gies such as MicroSort and PGS, but the less affluent will use
the socially stigmatized selective abortion (2010). Another
argument ties into the slippery slope argument, if this path
is taken, it will inevitably result in two classes within society
– those with and without access to genetic enhancements
(Strong, 2001). One way to overcome this concern is to advo-
cate for universal access to the technology. Another way to
improve access to a technology is by using market forces,
stimulate competition and, consequently, lower the prices.
Thus, if there is true concern about poor couples being ‘left
out’, the use of the technology should not be discouraged,
but rather encouraged. This is potentially the best way to
lower its current price.
‘Playing God’
A constantly recurring objection to sex selection is that
choosing the sex of our children is ‘playing God’. What is
‘natural’ ought to be respected as part of divine creation.
When something disrupts this natural order, such as a sys-
tem of the body not functioning as it should, it is acceptable
to make corrections back to what is a typical species func-
tion, but to step beyond natural function is hubris (Baldwin,
2006). This religious objection has been made against all
kinds of medical innovations. The use of inoculations was
opposed with sermons preaching that diseases are ‘sent by
Providence’ for the punishment of sin. It is wrong of man
to escape from such divine retribution. An additional reli-
giously based argument is that the ability to beget children
should not be separated from the sexual act that is the
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expression of marital love. This is the position of the Roman
Catholic Church.
Historically, what has been thought of as divinely
ordained has changed. Even fundamentalist Christians
ceased to regard the alleviation of pain and the curing of
diseases as morally impermissible. What was once seen as
‘playing God’ is now seen as acceptable medical practice.
More importantly, the objection that sex selection is a
violation of divine law is an explicitly religious claim. As
Western liberal democracies are based on a strict separa-
tion of state and church, no government is entitled to pass
a law to enforce compliance with a specific religion. People
who consider the option of sex selection as contrary to their
religious belief are free to refrain from it, but they are not
permitted to use the coercive power of the state to impose
their theology upon those who do not share their religious
world view.
Discussion
There are two questions that must be addressed when
thinking about the ethics of sperm sorting for sex selection.
First, does the government have a strong enough interest in
prohibiting the use of the technology? Second, is it ethical
for individuals to use the technology for this particular
purpose?
The major justification for a government becoming
involved in regulating the use of sex-selection technologies
is if use of the technology is likely to have a detrimental
effect on society such as skewing the sex ratio. Based on
the existing empirical evidence, it is highly unlikely that
the availability of an effective sperm-sorting technology
will have any noticeable effect on sex ratios in Western
countries.
Additionally, alternative sex-selection methods are cur-
rently available to couples around the globe through PGS
and prenatal screening with selective abortion. Soon, it
may be possible for women to know the sex of a fetus as
early as 7 weeks into a pregnancy through screening of fetal
cells found in maternal blood (Devaney et al., 2011). Labo-
ratories could eventually offer these blood tests through the
mail without the involvement of the medical community.
This would allow for a private abortion using non-surgical
interventions such as mifepristone before anyone else is
aware of the pregnancy.
Some countries have attempted to ban the use of these
technologies for non-medical sex selection. For instance,
physicians in India offering ultrasound for the sole purpose
of identifying the sex of a fetus can be prosecuted (Sarvate,
2006), and the UK and Canada only permit the use of PGS to
avoid genetic disease (Assisted Human Reproduction Act,
2004; HFEA, 2006).
In the USA, there have been attempts to make sex-
selective abortions illegal (Generations Ahead, 2010), but
even if these attempts were to become law, these laws would
be extremely difficult to enforce. The availability of PGS for
non-medical sex selection in the USA is up to each IVF clinic.
In a survey conducted by the Genetics and Public Policy
Centre (Baruch et al., 2008), 42% of IVF centres that provide
PGS for genetic diseases are also willing to provide PGS for
non-medical sex selection. Based on the survey results, in
2005 9% of all PGS cycles (or about 300 cycles among the
survey respondents) were for non-medical sex selection,
and 82% of PGS clinics will permit couples undergoing PGS
to avoid a genetic disease to select the sex of embryos that
are transferred to the woman’s uterus (Baruch et al., 2008).
Given that two more invasive and more expensive tech-
nologies are available for non-medical sex selection in the
USA and some other Western countries, and given that many
ineffective methods of sperm sorting are also available, it
would be counterintuitive to block the availability of an
effective method of sperm sorting such as MicroSort.
Because MicroSort requires a device, it falls under the juris-
diction of the FDA. MicroSort must be approved by the FDA
before it can be marketed. The FDA recently renewed its
permission for MicroSort clinical trials to proceed for cou-
ples wishing to avoid a X-linked genetic disease, but it did
not renew permission to continue clinical trials for ‘family
balancing’. This decision came with very little explanation
other than the FDA did not see a public-health benefit in
the use of MicroSort for non-medical purposes. This decision
by the FDA is odd given that drugs that prevent male pattern
baldness and Botox to reduce facial wrinkles have received
FDA approval.
If and when MicroSort receives FDA approval for
non-medical use, access will be controlled by one IVF cen-
tre. This centre can monitor requests for and actual use
of the technology. If statisticians determine that use of this
technology is, in fact, affecting the sex ratio of specific
communities, the centre could create a queue for the sex
that is in greater demand and only make the technology
available once an equal number of children of the opposite
sex are created (Heng, 2006).
Assuming that sex selection via sperm sorting is legal and
available, is it ethical for couples to use this technology?
This is a much more difficult question to answer. Like abor-
tion, the answer will vary from person to person. Many may
perceive all uses of sex-selection technology as a selfish
choice for those who do not perceive children as a gift,
but as a product of our will. Religious leaders may preach
against this use of the technology because it is hubris to
attempt to control characteristics of our children such as
their sex. On the other hand, couples may have what they
believe to be perfectly justifiable reasons to desire a child
of a specific sex. In a pluralistic society that values repro-
ductive freedom, couples ought to be able to decide for
themselves whether or not it is ethically permissible, under
their specific circumstances, to use a technology to attempt
to choose the sex of their children.
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